Introduction
When the Data Encryption Standard (DES) was adopted as a federal standard in 1977 [l] , its expected life was ten years. Nineteen years later, in 1996, the DES is still "going strong," and it continues to have a strong base of support within the financial community. The DES is a US. national standard and a de facto international standard. In 1993, the DES was recertified by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for another five years, although rumors persist that NIST may not recertify the DES again. During this time, no efficient attack against the DES has been reported, although several attacks based on exhaustive key search have been published , as well as attacks (differential cryptanalysis [6] and linear cryptanalysis [7] ) requiring massive amounts of known plaintext and corresponding ciphertext. (Linear cryptanalysis requires knowledge of 243 plaintext/ciphertext pairs, fewer than the 25h trial encipherment required for key exhaustion, but more difficult to arrange, because these 243 blocks must be enciphered on the target machine in possession of the secret key. Differential cryptanalysis is less efficient. Some discussion is found in [8] . ) Exhaustive key search remains the fastest known attack against the DES. But improvements in technology, leading to the potential for faster key search machines, now pose a greater threat to the use of single-key DES. The use of triple encryption with multiple keys is generally accepted as the best and most practical method for increasing the strength of the DES against key search attacks. It also guards against linear and differential cryptanalysis. Much effort has gone into attempted cryptanalysis of multiple DES"4 [9-121. Because the DES is still a fundamentally sound base on which to build, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) committee X9.F.1 is working to standardize a suite of modes of triple-DES encryption (X9.52). (Table 1 contains definitions for acronyms used in this paper.) Among the issues which must be addressed when settling on such triple-DES modes, one important issue concerns block size. Ordinary DES operates on 64-bit message blocks; there are 2" different 64-bit blocks; but if just 232 or 4000 million randomly chosen blocks have been encrypted, it is likely that the same block has been encrypted twice. (This is due to the "birthday phenomenon": If fl samples are produced randomly from among N possibilities, it is likely that two of them are the same.) This gives information to the attacker, since identical input blocks yield identical output; this is the "matching ciphertext attack." If we just replace the single-DES mode with the triple-DES mode, the block size remains at 64 bits, and the matching ciphertext attack remains a threat when a few billion blocks are processed. Another concern is a dictionary attack, where the attacker accumulates a dictionary of matching plaintext-ciphertext. If large enough, say a few billion blocks, the dictionary could permit some intercepted ciphertext to be decoded using a simple table lookup. This paper describes a method for increasing the strength of the triple-DES mode against the threat of dictionary and matching ciphertext attacks, without having to change the 64-bit block size of the DES algorithm. 
The present method is related to two earlier, simpler methods. Blaze describes a mode of file encryption in which a block of data is first exclusive-ORed with a secret mask value before being encrypted [17] . Concerned that multiple encryption techniques are computationally rather expensive, especially when implemented in software, Blaze sought a way to allow access to any point within an encrypted file but still discourage structural analysis and provide greater security than regular Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode. His method consists of "crunching" a long pass-phrase into two 56-bit DES keys. The first key is used to precompute a long (half-megabyte) pseudorandom bit mask using the DES OFB mode. When a file block is to be written, it is first exclusive-ORed with the part of the mask corresponding to its byte offset in the file. The result is then encrypted with the second key using ECB mode.
Jones describes a slightly different mode in which a secret masking value, calculated via a para1lel:running OFB mode, is exclusive-ORed with the .intermediate output of a double-DES (E-D) operation.5 to single-DES encryption (E); Jones performs masking inside a double-DES operation (E-D); the authors (Coppersmith, Johnson, and Matyas) perform masking inside,a triple-DES operation (E-D-E). However, under certain conditions, in both the Blaze and Jones methods, the effect of the exclusive-OR masking operation can be canceled out, thereby untangling the keys and exposing the method to attacks, which are detailed below. Knowledge of this method of attack suggested the present, proposed improved triple-DES mode.
To contrast the methods: Blaze performs masking prior
Triple-DES Cipher Block Chaining with External Feedback
We present, for comparison, another triple-DES mode that is part of a suite of encryption modes in the ANSI X9.F.1 triple-DES draft standard (X9.52). One of these modes is termed Triple-DES External Feedback Cipher Block Chaining (TCBC), i.e., cipher block chaining (CBC) with external feedback. The TCBC mode uses a nonsecret Triple-DES external feedback CBC has the following advantages:
1. The input and output block size is 64 bits, the same as 2. It is backward compatible with respect to single-key normal DES.
DES encryption.
Using one key value for all three key inputs results in the same output as a single-DES encryption.
If one block of ciphertext is corrupted, only two 3. It has limited error propagation.
blocks of recovered plaintext will be corrupted. This is known as the self-healing or self-synchronizing property of CBC encryption. 4. It is resistant to cryptanalytic exhaustive key search attacks. Using two keys, if FZ is the number of known plaintext blocks, the best known work factor is 2 '20/n [ 121.
Using three keys, the best known work factor is 2"' with some known plaintext; having many known plaintext blocks does not appear to reduce this work factor.
However, any multiple-key CBC mode of operation with external feedback using a 64-bit block size has the following disadvantages:
1. It cannot be simulated easily using existing DES modes of operation. This means that existing systems may not be able to simulate TCBC mode without a significant functional upgrade. 2. The mode, as defined, is not straightforward to pipeline for performance. Each block must be DES encrypted, decrypted, and encrypted before the next block is processed.
An alternate mode could be defined by interleaving the data [that is, chaining (exclusive-ORing) the ciphertext to the plaintext Xi], but this
Triple-DES external feedback cipher block chaining (TCBC).
3. It has the complementarity property, which an attacker can exploit in some situations. The complementarity property may be expressed
, where e is DES encryption, K is any key, x is any 64-bit value, and C ( x ) indicates bitwise complementation (bit inversion). The complementarity property allows testing for two keys for the cost of one encryption if 1) a ciphertext block happens to be the complement of another ciphertext block, or 2 ) a plaintext block happens to be the complement of another plaintext block. This property is therefore a possible aid to key exhaustion by reducing the work factor by about half in certain cases. 4. It has a potential text dictionary concern.
Having known plaintextkiphertext pairs allows entries in a dictionary to be built. The larger the dictionary, the better the chance to find a match in the dictionary for any specific ciphertext; and the larger the amount of ciphertext, the better the chance for a matching entry to be found in a dictionary of a given size. Consider the extremes, when using TCBC mode with a 64-bit block size: If one has a dictionary of 264 entries, all ciphertext is exposed; and if one has a dictionary with a single entry, it takes about 263 complicates the protocol. ciphertext blocks to expect one of the ciphertext
The Blaze method: Single-DES ECB with OFB masking mode. blocks to be known, revealing a secret.' A more realistic attack occurs when about half of the encrypted text is secret and half is known. In this case, when about 232 blocks of text have been encrypted, secret information should be expected to begin to leak, because of the birthday phenomenon (as mentioned above, when 232 = 9 random message blocks have been produced, we expect two of them to be equal); this is known as the crossover point, since exposures are expected at this point unless additional side conditions are assumed.'
256
However, note that chaining is much better than no chaining, as otherwise a dictionary for information that has redundancy (text, code, etc.) will be much smaller and therefore much easier to build. In effect, doing chaining with a pseudorandom value ensures that a complete dictionary must correspond to the block size, which is the best that can he achieved. Two ciphertext blocks can be expected to match by chance after about Z3* blocks have been encrypted; call them Yi and 5, and call the corresponding secret plaintext X , and X,. If a match happens, we know that Y , -, $ X I = Y,-, $X, because the ciphertexts matched. Therefore, we know that Yl-l @Y,-l = Xi@X,. If the plaintext has significant redundancy in it (for example, character data), there is a good chance that the value X , $ X j will leak information. Therefore, after about 232 encryptions, one should expect secrecy to begin to be lost in the general case without additional assumptions.
Remark The "text dictionary" and "matching ciphertext" differ in that the former depends on one unknown message block matching a known message block, while the latter depends on two unknown message blocks agreeing. In each case the probability of success varies as the square of the number of message blocks which have been encrypted. We show in Table 2 the number of random message blocks enciphered and the probability, for each of the two attacks, that a single match has occurred, and so a single message block has been exposed. Limiting exposure of a single message block is a very conservative criterion.
Because of these two attacks, it is a good idea to limit the total amount of text encrypted under TCBC mode using a 64-bit block size to something less than 232 blocks, which is 235 bytes or 32 gigabytes, with the exact limits depending on the risk of leakage that one is willing to take, in view of the table. For many applications, such a limit will not raise a concern; however, with the increasing network speeds and massive databases found today and the likelihood of even faster speeds and larger databases in the future, these limits could be exceeded. For this reason, the new mode of triple-DES encryption was included in the suite of encryption modes in the ANSI X9.F.1 triple-DES draft standard (X9.52).
Attacks against earlier schemes (Blaze and Jones)
We examine here the method of Blaze [17] , and an attack against it. The construction, and the attack, provide motivation for our own construction.
The Blaze method (Figure 2 ) has two secret DES keys, K , and K,, which are produced from a secret "pass-phrase.'' Using the first key, K , , and a standard "initializing vector" IV, one produces a long (half- This suggests the following attack, which is only three times as expensive as single-key exhaustion (that is, 3 X 2j6 encryptions, and no memory requirements). For each of 2jh trial values k , for the unknown key K,, he evaluates the quantity d(k,, Y , ) @ d ( k , , Y:) , and compares against the known value X, @Xt'. For the correct value k , = K,, the two quantities will be equal. For an incorrect value k , # K, the two might accidentally agree, but with a slim probability r h 4 , so that the expected number of "false alarms" is only 2jh X 2" = 11256. Thus, he is highly likely to find K, unambiguously. (In the case of ambiguity, he can try another index j # i.)
Having found K,, he can find the mask values M , from M t = X , @ d ( K , , Y l ) , and discover the key K , by single-key exhaustion, by seeing which trial value k , for K , satisfies the requirement M , = e ( k , , M l -, ) .
The attacker was able to separate the effects of the two keys K , and K,, so that he could attack each key separately by (essentially) single-key exhaustion. A strong scheme must entangle the effects of the several keys more known, we can use an attack suggested by Michael Jones' mentions a method (ECBIOFBIECB) taking the idea one step further. As with the Blaze method, the Jones method (Figure 3 ) produces a sequence of masking values M , using a key K , and initializing vector IV with output feedback mode. It then applies MI, by exclusive-OR, in the middle of a double-DES operation: The plaintext X I is enciphered under a DES key K,, the result is exclusive-ORed with M I , and this result is deciphered under a DES key K, to produce the ciphertext Y,: In contrast to the Blaze method, the attack here is made
The proper values (K,, K,) lead to a match. Each of the 256 x 256 = 2112 potential pairs ( k 2 , k , ) has a probability 2-b4 of creating an accidental match, so that one expects 24x "false alarms." For each match, the opponent tries the pair ( k 2 , k,) at a different index location j , testing whether e(k,, Y,)@e(k,, Y' ) = e(k,, Xj)$e (k,, X,!) . One expects that only the correct pair (K,, K,) satisfies both matches.
Having found the keys K, and K,, he can find K , by exhaustion, as before. A more efficient implementation of meet-in-the-middle attacks is given by van Oorschot and Wiener [18] .
Apparently the problem with both of these approaches (Blaze and Jones) is that the effects of the several keys are not sufficiently tangled with one another, and it is too easy to separate them out and attack the keys individually. In the present design we attempt to overcome this weakness.
Internal feedback
Having seen the weaknesses of external feedback, one might be tempted to design modes with internal feedback 
Objectives of the new mode
The design objectives for the new feedback mode are as follows:
1. The input and output block size is 64 bits, an ANSI X9.F.1 requirement. 2. Understandable design. 3. Stronger than TCBC mode with regard to text 4. Stronger than TCBC mode with regard to the 5. Mask patterns in the input plaintext. dictionary attacks. matching ciphertext attack.
Note that it was not a design objective to be backward compatible with an existing mode of operation.
Triple-DES external feedback CBC with OFB masking (CBCM) mode
The newly proposed mode uses triple-DES with external feedback CBC and OFB masking (CBCM). It is a triple-DES mode that uses a secret masking value (Figure 4) . The secret masking value is calculated via a parallelrunning OFB mode and is exclusive-ORed at each iteration with the intermediate outputs of the CBC mode. The CBCM mode is a unique design with the characteristic that it cannot be simulated using a combination of other modes.
Strength of Triple-DES external feedback CBC with OF6 masking (CBCM) mode
With regard to a matching ciphertext or dictionary attack, the adversary is forced to launch a separate attack for each IVl and each separate iteration of CBC encryption. We assume that an adversary cannot use the keys ( K , , K2, and K,) in other cryptographic operations that might allow the keys to be attacked with less work than in the CBCM mode. For example, we assume that an adversary has no means to cause K , to be used in an ordinary OFB mode such that its outputs would be exposed, since this would allow the MI, M,, etc. values to be exposed for a particular IV1 and K,.
With regard to a cryptanalytic key discovery attack, CBCM mode appears to be about as strong as TCBC mode. Of the attacks which the authors investigated, the most promising (described below) appears to require Z9' DES operations, as well as 234 blocks of chosen ciphertext and corresponding plaintext. (The chosen ciphertext requirement is unusual, and arises because of the outer chaining.) Without large amounts of known plaintext and ciphertext (234 blocks), the known attacks require 2"* or more operations. The opponent is looking for a pair of indices (i, j ) (K,, YJ') . Call this a "coincidence." These two quantities represent the outputs of the box d(K,, *) at different instances; because they agree, the corresponding inputs agree, namely M,@e (K,, X,@Y,-,) = MJ$e(K,, XJ'@YJ!-,) . Combining these two equations, he would have that (K,, XJ!@YJ'-,) . ( k , , X t @ y -, ) and d ( k , , Y,')$e(k,, X;@YJ!-,) for indices i, j up to 233, and compares the lists, looking for matches: (k,, y;)@e(k,, X;@YJ"_,) . In case of a match, he also checks whether the second In the most promising attack, the opponent creates two Because the masking values M, depend only on K,, 1V1, The attacker selects a trial value k , for the key K,. He X;@Y:-,) . When both hold, one calls it a "double match." One expects that for the correct key k , = K,, there will be one or two such double matches, while probably none will appear for incorrect keys, so this procedure serves to find K,. Its cost is 256 X 2 X 2,' = 2'' decipherments.
Having found K , , it is easier to find K , (K,, Ya,,)@e(K,, Xa,b@YYo,b-l) = d (K,, ' C ,~) @~(~I , X c , d @ Y c , d -l ) and d ( K l , ' o , d 
Find M,@Md = d (K, , Y0, , )@d(K, , Yc, d) 
Remark on reusing the IV
This paper outlines several attacks involving the decryption of two or more messages using the same IV.
This reinforces the good advice never to use the same IV twice. Even if this advice is followed, one might be concerned that an attacker with temporary access to the target machine could force the reuse of the same IV on several decrypted messages. For this reason, we have made the rather conservative assumption that the attacker has this capability, and we have evaluated the strength of 260 our present system against such an attacker. would have required an additional encryption for each block, for a total of five encryptions per block rather than the present four. Even without this enhancement, the present scheme seems secure enough to withstand attacks for many years to come.
Properties of the present mode
Finally, we are able to list the properties of the present mode, to enable comparison with other modes.
1. The input and output block size is 64 bits, the same as 2. It is not backward compatible with respect to single-3. It has limited error propagation with regard to normal DES.
key DES encryption.
corruption, but unlimited with regard to synchronization:
If one block of ciphertext is corrupted, only two blocks of recovered plaintext will be corrupted.
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
If synchronization is lost (a block is lost), all succeeding recovered plaintext will be in error. It requires four DES encryptions or decryptions per 64-bit block. The OFB process (using K 3 ) can be run in parallel with the CBC process (using K , and K 2 ) , but the CBC process cannot be pipelined except by interleaving the data as discussed above with regard to the TCBC mode.
It requires maintenance of three secret keys and two nonsecret initialization vectors (IV1 and IV2). It cannot be simulated easily using existing DES modes of operation.
It appears to be secure against chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext attacks: known attacks require 234 blocks of chosen text and 290 encryptions.
It has a complementarity property:
If IV1, K,, and K , are all complemented, the resulting method is not affected; it still encrypts X ; into Y,.
If IV2, K , , and K , are all complemented, the resulting method encrypts X ; into C ( Y l ) , the complement of Y,.
Most significantly, the potential concerns with text dictionary and with matching ciphertext have been solved.
Concluding remarks
We have presented a new method for multiple DES encryption. Like other triple-DES modes, it uses several independent keys, achieving strength against keyexhaustion attacks. Unlike other modes, it also defends against attacks based on the small block size, namely dictionary attacks and matching ciphertext attacks. We therefore recommend that the new mode (CBCM) be adopted by ANSI.
